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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GORGOZA, INCORPORATED,
a corporation, and JAMES
B. CONKLING and DONNA D.
CONKLING, his wife,
Case No- 14351
Plaintiffs and
Appellants
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, by and
through its ROAD COMMISSION,
Defendant and
Respondent
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover damages for the breach
of a contract under which the defendant Utah State Road
Commission (now Department of Transportation) obligated itself
to provide reasonable commercial access to the plaintiffs1
winter resort facilities pursuant to eminent domain proceedings in which the State Road Commission eventually condemned
approximately eight acres of the plaintiffs1 land.

In the same

action, plaintiffs alleged that the Commission negligently created
a defective, unsafe and dangerous condition of a highway and other
public improvements which caused the plaintiffs1 injury.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Third Judicial
District Court, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Judge,
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granting defendant State Road Commission's motion for summary
judgment and dismissing plaintiffs1 complaint with prejudice
on the grounds that no binding agreement or enforceable contract existed between the parties and that the State had not,
therefore, waived its immunity from suits of this kind.

(R. 133.)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs pray the court to reverse the aforesaid
summary judgment and to remand the case for trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In response to Governor Rampton's appeal for the
development of new industries in Utah, plaintiffs James B. and
Donna D. Conkling initiated and developed the Gorgoza SummerWinter Resort which opened for business in Summit County, Utah,
during the month of December, 196 8.

(R. 1, 38.)

Following a

profitable first year's operation, the State Road Commission
closed the lower portion of Parley's Canyon for the purpose of
constructing a section of Interstate Highway 80 - East. After
unsuccessfully appealing the closure and in spite of the difficulties presented thereby, Gorgoza managed to remain in operation
for a second year.

Planned investments in summer facilities were

necessarily postponed, however, as potential investors withdrew
their subscriptions and the SBA declined to approve Gorgoza's
loan application.
When Parley's Canyon reopened during the summer of

-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1970, Gorgoza obtained the required financing and began construction of additional summer and winter facilities, reserving
additional funds to complete its summer facilities the following
spring.

In September of 1970, the resort embarked upon its

third year of operations.
Prior to reopening for its third winter season, Gorgoza
officials held several meetings with representatives of the State
Department of Highways in an attempt to determine how the resort
would be affected by future 1-80 and frontage road construction
projects.

In addition, Gorgoza officials supplied the State with

cost data and other information which pointed out Gorgoza's need
for adequate access to its commercial and recreational facilities
during periods of construction in the canyon.

(R. 33-35.)

In early spring of 1971, the plaintiffs became concerned
about the indefinite work schedule on 1-80 and the frontage road,
the lack of specific information regarding commercial access
from U.S. 40 during the upcoming construction periods, and
unresolved problems about entrance lighting and highway signs.
Plaintiff James Conkling therefore initiated direct correspondence
with Mr. Henry Helland, Director of the Department of Highways,
concerning these problems.

(R. 36-40.)

When the Department's

response failed to provide sufficiently detailed information on
which to base future development plans, Mr. Conkling by letter of
May 29, 1971, specifically requested the State's assurance "that
we will have the kind of access that will permit us to stay in
business during the construction stages."

(R. 40.)
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During the first week of June, 1971, Mr. Leland D.
Ford, attorney for the State Road Commission, contacted Mr.
Robert F. Orton, attorney for plaintiffs, and requested that
Mr. Orton accept service of process and consent to the entry of
an order of immediate occupancy on behalf of Gorgoza in an
eminent domain proceeding which was being instituted by the State
for the purpose of condemning approximately eight acres of the
plaintiffs1 land.

(R. 1, 76.)

Mr. Orton agreed to accept

service of process and to consent to immediate entry of the
order in exchange for the State's promise that certain terms,
provisions, and obligations regarding access to and use of
Gorgoza's remaining property during the construction period
would be incorporated into and made a part of the order.

(R. 76.)

Thereafter Mr. Ford submitted a proposed order of immediate
occupancy to Mr. Orton which was rejected on the grounds that
it did not spell out the State's obligations in sufficient detail.
(R. 76 and Exhibit "A" at 80-82.)
On the 7th day of June, 1971, Mr. Orton and Mr. Ford
negotiated and agreed upon the terms to be included in the order
of immediate occupancy to be entered by the Fourth Judicial
District Court of Summit County, State of Utah.

(R. 76.)

On

the same day, Mr. Orton acknowledged service of process on behalf
of Gorgoza and the court entered the order incorporating the
stipulation and agreement of the parties.
at 87-89.)

(R. 77 and Exhibit "B"

Following the entry of said order, the venue of the
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eminent domain proceedings was changed to the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

(R. 77.)

By stipulating and agreeing to the entry of said order
of immediate occupancy, defendant State Road Commission agreed
and was ordered to provide plaintiffs and the general public
with reasonable access to the remaining property of Gorgoza so
as not to interfere with the commercial and recreational activities being conducted thereon, nor to discourage the general
public from frequenting and going upon the property.

(R. 77.)

The term "reasonable" for purposes of the order was defined to
include "safe and easy ingress and egress to and from said property
and notice to the general public of the access to Gorgoza's
remaining property."

(R. 88.)

Defendant State Road Commission

further agreed to be enjoined and was enjoined by the order from
hindering or interfering with the use, occupation and enjoyment
by plaintiffs of their remaining property and the commercial and
recreational activities being conducted thereon.

(R. 77.)

During the fall of 1971, an intolerable situation
developed regarding access to Gorgoza1s property.

(R. 21.)

The frontage road had not been completed, no access route from
U.S. 40 had been constructed, and the deadline for deciding
whether to reopen for a fourth winter season was rapidly
approaching.

(R. 41.)

Because of the seriousness of the problem,

on September 24, 1971, James Conkling met directly with Governor
Rampton to inform him of the situation and to appeal for emergency
aid.

(R. 21.)

Following this meeting, Mr. Conkling met with
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representatives of the State Department of Highways on September
28, 1971, to discuss the problem and to submit certain data
prepared by Gorgoza for the State's review.

(R. 21, 41-45.)

At this meeting, the State Highway Engineer, Mr. Blaine Kay,
gave assurances that Gorgoza would be promptly provided with
a surfaced entrance and driveway in the area of Gorgoza's choice
so as to alleviate the critical access problem.

(R. 21.)

On October 5, 1971, Mr. Conkling again contacted Mr. Kay to
inform him of his concern over the State's apparent decision
to improve Gorgoza's sloping middle entrance instead of its
level western entrance as previously discussed, and to request
further assurances that adequate commercial access would be
made available so that the crucial decision about opening for
the 1971-72 winter season could be made.

(R. 46, 48.)

Although the State did construct an access to
Gorgoza's property by way of its middle entrance on or about
October 15, 1971, by October 29, 1971, it was apparent that the
access was in utter disrepair.

(R. 50-51.)

On November 2,

Mr. Conkling notified Mr. Kay of the terrible condition of the
access road and urgently requested that improvements be made to
correct the situation.

(R. 50.)

Mr. Kay consequently reminded

the district engineer in writing of the State's commitment to
Gorgoza and directed him to make the necessary improvements as
soon as possible.

(R. 51.)

On November 11, Gorgoza received notice from its
insurance company that its policies had been cancelled on the

-6-
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grounds that the resort was not ready for inspection due to the
access problem.

(R. 22.)

Faced with this development together

with the intolerable access situation, Gorgoza officials decided
to discontinue operations indefinitely and so notified the State.
(R. 52.)
During the summer of 1972, the access situation had
still not improved which resulted in further deterioration of
prospective investor interest.

(R. 22.)

Gorgoza officials

therefore obtained an order to show cause why the order of immediate occupancy previously entered should not be vacated and the
condemnation action dismissed or, alternatively, why they should
not be granted other appropriate relief.
at 94.)

(R. 77 and Exhibit "C"

On the 27th day of October, 1972, the parties stipulated

and agreed to the entry of an order on order to show cause which
permitted Gorgoza officials to assert their claims for damages
arising out of the alleged breach of the provisions of the order
of immediate occupancy in an independent action.

(R. 77-78 and

Exhibit "D" at 96.)
On November 7, 1972, the parties entered into a stipulation for just compensation in the eminent domain proceedings which
stipulation contained the following language:
Defendants [Gorgoza, Incorporated, James B. Conkling
and Donna D. Conkling] reserve all rights described
in the order on order to show cause entered by this
Court on the 27th day of October, 1972, which order
is on file herein and further reserve all rights
described in the order of immediate occupancy dated
the 7th day of June, 1971, which order of immediate
occupancy is on file herein and the parties hereto

-7-
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hereby agree that they shall continue to be bound
by all of the provisions of said order of immediate
occupancy.
(R. 78.) (Emphasis added.)
The stipulation described above did not fully dispose
of the eminent domain proceedings and a trial was thereafter
conducted.

Following the trial, the Third Judicial District

Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entered findings of
fact and conclusions of law which provided as follows:
Defendants Gorgoza and Conkling have reserved all
rights described in the order on order to show
cause entered by this Court on the 27th day of
October, 1972, and in the order of immediate
occupancy dated June 7, 1971, and the Court finds
that defendants have not waived any of said rights.
(Finding of Fact Number 23, R. 78; See also Conclusion of Law Number 6, R. 7 8.)
The plaintiffs filed their complaint for money damages
against the State Road Commission and its general contractor
on February 8, 1974. (R. 1.)

Following discovery procedures,

both Gorgoza and the State Road Commission filed motions
for summary judgment supported by a stipulation of facts
on the sole issue whether the agreement between the parties
which was incorporated into the order of immediate occupancy
entered on June 7, 1971, constituted a valid contractual obligation which was binding on the State.

(R. 119-20; 128-29.)

After duly considering the motions, the Honorable
Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. adopted the parties1 stipulation of facts
and granted defendant State Road Commission's motion for summary
judgment as prayed.

(R. 130-32.)

The court then dismissed

plaintiffs1 entire complaint, including the negligence count,
with prejudice and this appeal followed.
-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN GORGOZA AND
THE STATE ROAD COMMISSION, NEGOTIATED
AND EXECUTED BY THE ATTORNEY FOR THE
COMMISSION, CREATED A BINDING CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION WHICH IS ENFORCEABLE AGAINST THE STATE, SINCE THE
AGREEMENT WAS FULLY ADOPTED AND
RATIFIED BY THE COMMISSION FOLLOWING
ITS EXECUTION BY THE STATE'S ATTORNEY.
The sole issue submitted to the lower court for determination on the parties' respective motions for summary judgment
was whether a valid, existing and enforceable contract between
Gorgoza and the State Road Commission was created under the
factual situation before the court.

Gorgoza contends that the

lower court erred in its first, sixth, and seventh conclusions
of law to the effect that no such contract was created under
the facts.
A.

(R. 130-31.)
COURTS WILL ENFORCE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
ENTERED INTO BY THE PARTIES TO A CONDEMNATION
SUIT.

Courts have frequently pointed out the difference in
legal effect between mere promissory statements made by a condemning authority and valid, contractual, and therefore binding
stipulations between the parties to a condemnation suit.
26 Am.Jur.2d Eminent Domain §154 at 821 (1966); Annot., 7 ALR2d
364, 392 (1949).

If a particular case involves an agreement

based on mutual assent and legal consideration, the agreement
is properly to be considered in determining the property owner's
damages or compensation.

See Annot., 7 ALR2d. supra at 393,
-9-
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and cases cited therein.

If a binding stipulation does exist,

numerous courts have declared that any marked departure therefrom
as to the character of the work to be accomplished or the rights
to be reserved would subject the condemnor to an action for
damages in favor of the landowner whose land was being taken.
Id. at 397.
Although Gorgoza does not contend that its remaining
property was "taken" by the State's failure to provide reasonable
commercial access as agreed, it does contend that the cases
cited above clearly support the principle that binding contractual
agreements between the condemning authority and the condemnee
will be given legal effect where necessary to protect the landowner from additional damage caused by the condemnor•s subsequent
breach.
In the instant case, the stipulation of facts on file
herein makes it clear that:
1.

Plaintiffs and defendant State Road Commission

by and through their respective attorneys arrived at the terms
of an agreement regarding commercial access to plaintiffs1
remaining land by negotiation and mutual assent.

(Stipulation

of Facts Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6, R. 76.)
2.

The terms of this agreement were subsequently

incorporated into the order of immediate occupancy entered by
the court on June 7, 1971.
3.

(Stipulation of Fact No. 6, R. 76.)

In arriving at the terms of the agreement, plaintiffs1

attorney promised to accept service of process on behalf of his

-10-
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clients and thereby waived Gorgoza's objections to the proposed
location of the new highway in exchange for the State's promise
to incorporate certain terms, provisions and obligations regarding access and use of plaintiffs1 remaining property into the
proposed order of immediate occupancy.

(Stipulation of Fact

No. 4, R. 76.)
4.

Plaintiffs thereby incurred a legal detriment

in that they agreed to accept service of process and to permit
immediate entry of an order of immediate occupancy which they
were not previously obligated to do.

Plaintiffs simultaneously

conferred a benefit on defendant State Road Commission by eliminating the time and expense of serving process on nonresident
defendants, waiting for a hearing date on the motion, and presenting evidence in support of the motion at the hearing.
(Stipulation of Facts Nos. 3 and 4, R. 76.)
5.

Similarly, defendant State Road Commission incurred

a legal detriment by promising to provide reasonable access to
plaintiffs' remaining land and to be enjoined from interfering
with plaintiff's commercial and recreational use, both of which
duties defendant State Road Commission was not previously obligated to perform.

(Stipulation of Fact No. 8, R. 77; R. 105.)

Simultaneously, defendant State Road Commission conferred a
benefit on plaintiffs by saving them the time and expense of
additional litigation or negotiating procedures to resolve the
problem at that time.

-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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6.

The terms of the agreement between the parties

have not been altered in any way since the order of immediate
occupancy was entered on June 7, 1971. On the contrary, the
parties subsequently reaffirmed the provisions of the order and
agreed to continue to be bound thereby,

(Stipulation of Fact

No. 12, R. 78.)
It is fundamental contract law that an agreement between
two or more parties having capacity to contract, which is based
on mutual assent and supported by legally sufficient consideration, creates a binding obligation in the absence of any grounds
for disaffirming the contract.
(3d ed. 1957).

1 S. Williston, Contracts §1

Furthermore, it makes no difference whether the

terms of the contract are embodied in a formal pleading or in a
separate instrument as long as the terms are clear and not altered
by subsequent agreement of the parties.
supra.

See Annot., 7 ALR2d 364,

In the instant case, plaintiffs contend that the basic

elements of an enforceable contractual obligation have been
stipulated to by the parties before the court.

The State denies

that it is bound by the agreement, however, on the grounds (inter
alia) that its attorney lacked power to bind the Commission without
its prior knowledge, approval and consent.
B.

(R. 107-08.)

WHATEVER ACTS PUBLIC OFFICIALS MAY DO OR AUTHORIZE
TO BE DONE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE MAY SUBSEQUENTLY
BE ADOPTED AND RATIFIED BY THEM.

According to the general rule set forth in the cases
and supported by the decisions of this court, the contractual act

-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of a public officer which is beyond the scope of his authority
is not binding on the state unless the following conditions are
met:
1.

The particular state agency involved would have

been authorized to perform the act or enter into the agreement
in the first instance; and
2.

The state agency either held out the officer as

having authority to perform the original act or subsequently
ratified the act with full knowledge of the facts.

Farelly Lake

Levee District v. Hampton, 228 Ark. 242, 306 S.W.2d 699 (1957);
Yaeger v. Giguerre, 222 Minn. 41, 23 N.W.2d 22 (1946).

See

also State Road Commission v. Bates, 20 Utah 2d 175, 435 P.2d
417 (1967).
In the context of the case at bar, the Yaeger case
is particularly enlightening.

In that case the plaintiffs,

as members of the police department and taxpayers in the City
of South St. Paul, brought suit against the city treasurer and
others to enjoin the defendants from paying out any further
public funds as compensation for the services of one Ed Giguerre
who was allegedly employed as a police officer in violation of
certain civil service statutes and local rules.

The nub of the

controversy was that defendant Giguerre obtained a leave of absence
with the approval of the police chief, but without the final
approval of the civil service commission as required under the
rules.

From a judgment denying injunctive relief, the plaintiffs

appealed.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the lower
-13-
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court on the grounds that the subsequent act of the commission
in approving defendant's leave, constituted a valid ratification
of the police chief's action:
There can be no question that the commission
had the authority in the first instance to
approve the leave as granted by the chief of
police. It is a general rule that whatever
acts public officials may do or authorize to
be done in the first instance may subsequently
be adopted or ratified by them with the same
effect as though properly done under previous
authority. Applying this rule to the instant
case, it is clear that the civil service commission by its belated action ratified the
granting of a leave of absence with the same
effect as if originally authorized. 23 N.W.
2d at 25 (citations omitted).
The decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota
in Yaeger is consistent with this court's decision in the case
of State Road Commission v. Bates, 20 Utah 2d 175, 435 P.2d 417
(1967).

In that case, the State Road Commission brought a

condemnation action to obtain a narrow strip of land belonging
to the defendants which adjoined a nonaccess freeway.

No

issue was raised as to the state's right to take the land or as
to the value thereof.

The landowners did claim severance damage

to their remaining land, however, by reason of their loss of
access to the canyon stream for stock watering purposes. This
contention was based upon an alleged promise by the state's
negotiator that if the landowners would sign the deed, the
Commission would provide the water.

435 P.2d at 417.

In affirming the lower court's decision, this court
held that the evidence supported the findings that the landowners
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had been previously paid for their loss of access to water and
that the purported promise of the state's negotiator to get
water up onto the defendant's land was not binding on the Commission.

43 5 P.2d at 418. This holding, however, was based on

a factual situation that is clearly distinguishable from the case
at bar; namely, that the Commission in Bates denied that it
ever made any promise to the landowners, and there was no evidence
of any subsequent ratification.

435 P.2d at 417.

In the instant case, the record abundantly demonstrates
that the State Road Commission had the authority to enter into
the original agreement with Gorgoza and that it subsequently
adopted and ratified the agreement executed by its attorney
with full knowledge of the facts.

Since each condition is

essential to create a contractual obligation which is binding
on the State, each will be considered separately.
1.

THE STATE ROAD COMMISSION WAS AUTHORIZED TO
ENTER INTO THE CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT WITH
GORGOZA AT THE TIME IT WAS MADE.

At the time the original agreement with Gorgoza was
made, the State Road Commission enjoyed the following general
powers and duties:
The commission shall administer the state highways
and exercise those powers and duties which relate
to the determination and carrying out of the
general policy of the state relating thereto.
It shall exercise such control over the location,
establishment, changing, construction and maintenance of highways as is provided by law. Utah
Code Ann. §27-12-7 (Repl. vol. 1969).
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In addition to the above general powers, the Commission was
also vested with the following specific powers which are
relevant here:
(1) To formulate and adopt rules and regulations and establish programs for the expenditure
of public funds for the construction, improvement
and maintenance of state highways, and other purposes authorized by law, and for letting contracts
for any work which the commission is authorized
by law to do.
(2) To determine what portion or portions of
any state highway shall be improved at the expense
of the state.
(17) To expend sufficient of the funds
allocated to the commission to accomplish the
purposes of this act. Utah Code Ann. §27-12-8
(Repl. vol. 1969).
Pursuant to the foregoing powers, the Commission was
authorized to enter into contracts and written agreements for
the construction and maintenance of state highways, Utah Code
Ann. §27-12-107 (Repl. vol. 1969), and could be sued on written
contracts made by it or under its authority.
§27-12-9 (Repl. vol. 1969)(emphasis added).

Utah Code Ann.
Finally, the

State Road Commission was vested with powers of eminent domain
for the purpose of condemning rights of way for state highway
purposes.

Utah Code Ann. §78-34-1 (1953); Barnes v. Wade,

90 Utah 1, 58 P.2d 297 (1936).
Pursuant to the lawful exercise of its eminent domain
powers, the State Road Commission, by and through its attorney,
entered into an agreement with the plaintiffs to provide reasonable commercial access to Gorgoza's remaining land during the
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construction period beginning in 1971.

The state's purpose in

negotiating the contract was to facilitate the entry of an order
of immediate occupancy without expending the time and money
required to serve nonresident defendants, wait for a hearing
date, and prepare and present evidence of the value of the premises sought to be condemned together with the damages which
would result, all in a contested matter.
§78-34-9 (Supp. 1975).

See Utah Code Ann.

Since the agreement was directed solely

at facilitating the lawful exercise of the Commission's eminent
domain power so that the highway project could be advertised
for bid without further delay, (R. 106), it clearly falls within
the Commission's broad authority to enter into contracts for
"any work which the Commission is authorized by law to do" as
set forth above.
2.

THE STATE ROAD COMMISSION ADOPTED AND RATIFIED
THE AGREEMENT WITH GORGOZA WITH THE SAME EFFECT
AS THOUGH PROPERLY EXECUTED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE.

According to the principles of ratification set forth
in Williston:
Subsequent affirmance by a principal of a contract
made on his behalf by one who had at the time
neither actual nor apparent authority constitutes
a ratification, and such ratification relates back
and supplies original authority to execute the
contract.
Ratification need not be express. Any conduct which
indicates assent or its equivalent by the purported
principal to become a party to the transaction,
or by reason of which he has precluded himself
from repudiating the transaction done by the
purported agent is sufficient. 2 S. Williston,
Contracts §278 at 253, 256-58 (3d ed. 1959)
(citations omitted).
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In the case at bar, the record abundantly demonstrates
that the State Road Commission acting through its Department of
Highways not only knew of the agreement to provide commercial
access to Gorgoza, but also took affirmative steps to begin to
carry it out.

The record also demonstrates that the Commission

has never denied the agreement, but has expressly admitted its
existence.

The specific facts on which Gorgoza bases its

allegation that the Commission ratified the agreement are as
follows:
a.

Beginning in 1970, Gorgoza officials met with

representatives of the State Department of Highways and
supplied them with information detailing Gorgoza's need for
adequate commercial access during periods of construction.
(R. 33-35.)
b.

During the spring of 1971, Mr. James Conkling

corresponded with the Director of the Department of Highways
concerning the access problem.

(R. 36-40.)

This correspondence

culminated on May 29, 1971, with Gorgozafs direct appeal for
the State's assurance that adequate commercial access would be
provided.

(R. 40.)
c.

The agreement at issue was negotiated and entered

into shortly thereafter.
d.

(R. 77.)

Gorgoza officials met with the State Highway

Engineer on September 28, 1971, at which time further oral
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assurances regarding access to the resort were given.
e.

(R. 21.)

On October 5, 1971, Mr. Conkling again contacted

the State Highway Department about its decision to construct
an access across Gorgozafs sloping middle entrance rather than
across its larger western entrance as agreed.
f.

(R. 46, 48.)

On or about October 15, 1971, the State Highway

Engineer directed the general contracter, W. W. Clyde and Company,
to construct an access road across Gorgoza's middle entrance and
public funds were expended to accomplish this purpose according
to the plans and specifications furnished by the project engineer.
(R. 60.)
g.

Following Mr. Conklingfs notice to the State

Highway Department of the unacceptable condition of the newly
constructed access road, (R. 50), the State Highway Engineer
sent a memorandum to the district engineer reiterating the
State's commitment to the agreement as follows:
MEMORANDUM
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS
DATE:
TO

:

J. Q. Adair, P.E.
District Engineer, District #2

FROM

:

Blaine J. Kay, P.E.
State Highway Engineer

SUBJECT:

November 10, 1971

Access and Signing for Gorgoza
Officials of Gorgoza have rightly complained
that problems in access have seriously hampered their
business. They are very concerned about the present
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condition of the recently constructed access road
and the lack of advance information to the traveling
public of this winter-oriented recreational area. I
have assured Mr. Jim Conkling, owner, that the
approach constructed late this fall will be maintained by the State through the limits of the newly
placed gravel. I have also informed him that we will
install temporary white on brown signing both east and
west (approximately 1500 feet) which will indicate
"Recreation Area 1500 Feet". A recent inspection
indicates that the approach road is in need of repair;
therefore, I would appreciate your early action in
making the necessary corrections and provide for the
installation of the mentioned signs.
cc:

Jim Conkling

(R. 51.)
h.

The State Road Commission has never denied the

existence of the agreement and has stated on the record that
the resulting problems in its implementation were caused by the
unreasonable conduct of its general contractor.

This position

is set forth in the Commission's answers to certain interrogatories propounded by W. W. Clyde and Company:
5. Does the State Road Commission contend that
W. W. Clyde and Company deviated in any manner from
the plans and specifications, or special orders given
to it on the job, for the construction of the approaches,
access roads, or highway in the area of the Gorgoza
resort?
ANSWER: Yes.
6. If the answer to the previous interrogatory
is in the affirmative, state each and every deviation
or variance from the plans and specifications or
special orders and state the name, address, and
position with the State Road Commission of any person
having knowledge of any such deviations or variances.
ANSWER: According to the project engineer's
diary, the defendant, W. W. Clyde and Company, was
directed on or about November 1, 1971, to construct
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a temporary approach and to install a drainage culvert
to provide safe and easy access to plaintiff's property.
This approach was to be a paved surface. As late as
November 12, 1971, the approach was not constructed
as directed and said defendant's equipment had to be
used to pull vehicles out of the approach because
of wet conditions caused by inclement weather. The
approach was paved on November 15, 1971, according to
the project engineer's diary. This defendant considers
the delay of the defendant, W. W. Clyde & Company, to
be unreasonable. The person having knowledge of these
facts is John F. Nye, Project Engineer, Utah State
Department of Highways, 2410 West 2100 South, Salt
Lake City, Utah. There are possibly other instances
where the contractor may have been derelict, but this
defendant cannot at this time state that that is the
case until all records are reviewed and checked.
(R. 72.)
i.

The existence of the agreement between Gorgoza and

the State Road Commission was admitted by the Commission on April
18, 1974, in its answer to plaintiffs' complaint.
4 of the First Count

In Paragraph

of plaintiffs' complaint, the following

allegation is made:
4. On the 7th day of June, 1971, plaintiffs
and defendant State of Utah, by and through
its Road Commission, after negotiating the
terms thereof, stipulated and agreed to the
entry of an Order of Immediate Occupancy by
the Fourth Judicial District Court of Summit
County, State of Utah, and on said date the
Court entered an Order of Immediate Occupancy
incorporating the said stipulation and agreement of the parties. A copy of said Order of
Immediate Occupancy is attached hereto as
Exhibit "A" and by this reference made a part
hereof. (R. 1-2.)(Emphasis added.)
Defendant State Road Commission subsequently admitted
plaintiffs' allegation in its entirety in Paragraph 3 of the
Second Defense of its Answer on file herein:
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3. This answering defendant admits the allegations of paragraph 3 and 4 of the First
Count of plaintiff's Complaint. (R. 11.)
This binding admission together with the above facts
on record herein, make it clear that the State Road Commission
has recognized, adopted and taken specific steps to implement
the contractual agreement executed by its attorney on June 7,
1971.

Indeed the Commission has never denied the existence or

terms thereof.

Gorgoza contends that such acts and conduct

together with the clear evidence of the State's intent as expressed
in the written memoranda, answers to interrogatories and admissions
on file herein, clearly demonstrate the State Road Commission's
adoption and ratification of the agreement of June 7, 1971.
Under the authorities cited above, the State's ratification was
effective as of the date of the original agreement.
Williston, Contracts §278 (3d ed. 1959)

See 2 S.

The State Road

Commission therefore incurred a binding contractual obligation
to provide reasonable commercial access to Gorgoza's remaining
land as of June 7, 1971.
POINT II
THE STATE'S AGREEMENT MAY NOT BE
DISAFFIRMED ON GROUNDS OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY, SINCE THE LEGISLATURE HAS EXPRESSLY WAIVED THE
STATE'S IMMUNITY FROM SUIT BASED
UPON THE ALLEGED BREACH OF A CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION.
The State argued below that plaintiffs' action was
barred by governmental immunity.
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Gorgoza

contends that the lower court erred in ruling on this question,
specifically by entering its fourth conclusion of law to the effect
that the negotiation and execution of the agreement by the State's
attorney constituted a waiver of governmental immunity which was
invalid.

(R. 131.)
The express provision of the Utah Governmental

Immunity Act relied on by plaintiffs reads as follows:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived as to any contractual obligation. Utah
Code Ann. §63-30-5 (Repl. vol. 1968).
In the case at bar, the State Road Commission has admitted that it entered into an agreement with the plaintiffs, the
terms of which were incorporated in the order of immediate occupancy entered June 7, 1971.

(R. 1-2; 11.)

Furthermore, even if

the Commission's attorney were not authorized to enter into this
agreement in the first place, the Commission later ratified
the agreement by its subsequent acts and admissions which
ratification related back to and supplied the original authority
to contract.

2 S. Williston, Contracts §278 (3d ed. 1959).

Defendant State Road Commission thereby incurred an express
contractual obligation to the plaintiffs as of June 7, 1971,
which is enforceable in an action for damages under the
express provisions of the Act itself.

^The statutory provision cited above was in effect during the
period of time in which the factual events pertaining to this
case took place. The section has since been amended. See
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-5 (Supp. 1975).
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In three recent cases, this court has considered the
question of impairment of access to property in view of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act.

In Boyce v. State Road Commission,

26 Utah 2d 138, 486 P.2d 387 (1971), the plaintiff brought an
action for damages to property, the access to which had been
allegedly destroyed by a state road construction project.
486 P.2d at 388. The basis of plaintiff's claim was that
certain agents of the State misrepresented to him that the
construction project would not injure or impede access to
his property.

Id.

This court upheld the State's claim of

immunity on the grounds that plaintiff's suit was barred by the
express provisions of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(6) (Repl. vol.
196 8) which prohibits suits against the State arising "out of
a misrepresentation" made by a state employee.

Id.

The Boyce case is clearly distinguishable from the
facts at issue here.

While in Boyce, the case turned upon an

alleged misrepresentation made by agents of the State, such was
never the case in Gorgoza.

On the contrary, Gorgoza's claim is

that an express contractual agreement, adopted and acted upon
by the State, was breached in that reasonable commercial
access was not provided as agreed.

The State in Gorgoza

has not even alleged that any misrepresentations were involved.
Thus the statutory provision under which plaintiffs' claim
was barred in Boyce is irrelevant to the consideration of the
plaintiffs' claim in Gorgoza.
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In another case brought to recover damages caused by
reason of the construction of a highway which impaired access
to property, the plaintiffs did not contest the validity of those
cases holding that in the absence of a taking of property there
can be no recovery against the State for damages due to the
impairment of access to property, but contended that the provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-30-6
(Repl. vol. 196 8) should be construed as affirmatively permitting
the maintenance of such action.

Holt v. Utah State Road Commission,

30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286, 1287 (1973).
The statutory provision in question reads as follows:
Immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for the recovery of any
property real or personal or for the possession thereof or to quiet title thereto, or
to foreclose mortgages or other liens thereon
or to determine any adverse claim thereon, or
secure any adjudication touching any mortgage
or other lien said entity may have or claim
on the property involved.
In construing this section in light of plaintiffs1
claims, the court strictly applied the Act and held that the
above section was not to be construed so as to include damage
actions of this character.

It should be clearly noted, how-

ever, that no allegation of any contractual obligation on the
part of the State was considered by the court in this case.
The third opinion was handed down by this court in
the case of Bailey Service & Supply Corp. v. State Road Com-
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mission, 533 P.2d 882 (Utah 1975).

In that case, the State

appealed from a judgment awarding damages to the plaintiff
arising out of the erection of a viaduct on Fourth South
Street in Salt Lake City.

533 P.2d at 883. Part of the

court's opinion in that case in instructive here:
Early in the proceedings the State Road Commission
entered into a stipulation with the plaintiff which
purported to waive governmental immunity. The stipulation was disavowed, and the State defended on the
ground that the State was immune from suit. Only
the legislature can waive sovereign immunity and the
Road Commission's attempt to do so was without legal
effect. The trial court did not base is (sic) decision
upon the ground that governmental immunity had been
waived but rather upon the court's determination
that there was a "taking" by reason of the interference
with the right of access.
The Bailey case is distinguishable from the case at
bar at several critical points:
1.

The stipulation itself purported to waive

governmental immunity in contravention of the express terms
of the Act;
2.

The stipulation was disavowed by the State.

In the instant case, plaintiffs contend that the State
of Utah adopted and ratified and thereby rendered binding the
contractual agreement with plaintiffs the terms of which were
incorporated into the order of immediate occupancy entered on
June 7, 1971. Thus the agreement in this case does not involve
any "purported waiver" of immunity as was referred to in Bailey,
but a transaction which falls squarely within the express waiver
provisions of the Act itself.

Furthermore, the state has not
-26-
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disaffirmed the agreement, but has admitted its existence, acted
pursuant to its terms, and affirmed its intention to be bound
thereby.

The State has incurred a binding contractual obligation

and should not be allowed to disaffirm it on the basis of authorities which are silent regarding the specific issue at bar.
POINT III
THE STATE'S AGREEMENT MAY NOT BE
DISAFFIRMED ON THE GROUNDS THAT
TEMPORARY OBSTRUCTION OF COMMERCIAL ACCESS IS NONCOMPENSABLE,
SINCE THE BASIS OF THE PLAINTIFFS' ....,
CLAIM IS THAT THE STATE ACTED UNREASONABLY IN BREACHING ITS CONTRACT WITH GORGOZA.
The State argued below that accepted principles of
eminent domain deny recovery for damages sustained for temporary
or permanent impairment of access.

(R. 108.)

Gorgoza's

position is that this general statement of eminent domain law
is subject to clear exception in the case of unreasonable
acts by the condemnor, which exception is fully applicable here.
Gorgoza therefore submits that the lower court erred in entering
its fifth conclusion of law which sets forth the general rule,
but fails to apply the relevant exceptions.

(R. 131.)

According to the general rule set forth in 2A Nichols,
Eminent Domain §6.4442[2] (rev. 3d ed. 1975),
When a street is so obstructed during the
construction of a public work that access to
abutting property is wholly cut off, the fact
that the injury is only temporary is generally
held to be no reason for denying the owner compensation. However, when access, though ren-
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dered difficult and inconvenient, is not wholly
cut off, the owner is denied compensation. This
is so even if there is such an injury to the use
of the property for business purposes during the
construction of the work as to materially affect
the value of the leasehold interests, and this
injury is due to the presence of structures in
the street that would undoubtedly constitute a
ground for compensation if they were maintained
there permanently.
This general rule is subject to clear exception,
however, in cases of negligence, unreasonable, unnecessary,
arbitrary or capricious acts by the condemnor.

Id.., citing

Hadfield v. State, 86 Idaho 561, 388 P.2d 1018 (1964);
Department of Public Works v. Ayon, 54 Cal.2d 217, 352
P.2d 519 (1960).
The "unreasonable interference" exception cited
above has been recognized in the decisions of this court.

In

the case of Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100,
349 P.2d 157 (1960), plaintiff brought a mandamus action to
compel members of the State Road Commission to initiate eminent
domain proceedings to assess damages allegedly caused by
impairment of ingress to and egress from the plaintiff's
property.

349 P.2d at 157-58.

In discussing the question

whether plaintiff's damages were compensable, the court made
the following statement:
In this area of the freeway, citizens must yield
to the common weal, albeit injury to their property
may result. We espouse the notion that if the
sovereign exercises its police power reasonably
and for the good of all the people, when constructing highways, consequential damages such as those
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alleged here, are not compensable. On the other
hand, if public officials act arbitrarily and
unreasonably, causing, for example, total destruction of the means to get in and out of one's
property, without any reasonable justification
for doing so in the public interest, in a manner
that imposes a special burden on one not shared by
the public generally, principles of equity no
doubt could be invoked to prevent threatened
action of such character or to remove any instrumentality born of such conduct. Plaintiff did
not allege or assert anything akin thereto.
349 P.2d at 158-59. (Emphasis added.)
In the instant case, plaintiffs alleged that defendant
State Road Commission violated its contractual obligation to
provide plaintiffs and the general public with reasonable
access to Gorgoza's remaining property.

(R. 2.)

The state

subsequently took the position that its general contractor
acted unreasonably in delaying proper construction of the
access road until on or about November 15, 1971, (R. 72), after
Gorgoza had been forced to abandon its operations.

(R. 52.)

Thus the interference involved here was of such a nature that
it would fall into the "unreasonable interference" category
which clearly supports a claim for damages under accepted
principles of eminent domain law as recognized by this court.
Under the authorities cited above, even in the absence
of contract, a landowner may recover damages for temporary
obstruction of commercial access if the obstruction is of an
unreasonable, unnecessary, arbitrary or capricious nature.
Plaintiffs contend that rather than affording defendant State
Road Commission grounds for disaffirming its contract, the
above line of authority supports plaintiffs' claim for damages
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based on unreasonable and unnecessary conduct i.e., a material
breach of a binding contractual obligation in the absence of
legal excuse for nonperformance.
POINT IV
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE STATE'S
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION MAY BE DISAFFIRMED,
THE LOWER COURT NEVERTHELESS ERRED IN
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS1 COMPLAINT IN ITS
ENTIRETY, SINCE CONTROVERTED ISSUES OF
MATERIAL FACT STILL EXIST BETWEEN THE
PARTIES
In the second count of their complaint, plaintiffs1
alleged that defendant State Road Commission acting through its
duly authorized agents and employees negligently created a
"defective, unsafe and dangerous condition of a highway, structures
and other public improvements of the State of Utah," all to the
plaintiffs1 damage.
denied by the State.

(R. 3.)

These allegations were subsequently

(R. 12.) Although both Gorgoza and

the State Road Commission only moved the court for summary
judgment on the sole issue whether the State had incurred a
binding contractual obligation as alleged in the first count of
plaintiffs1 complaint, (R. 119-20; 128-29), the lower court
nevertheless dismissed both counts of plaintiffs' complaint
as follows:

,....

t

i

That plaintiffs1 Complaint be dismissed with
prejudice on the grounds and for the reason
that defendant, State Road Commission, is
entitled to summary judgment in that there
is no binding agreement or enforceable contract existing between the parties as alleged
by plaintiff and the State has not, therefore,
waived its immunity from suit in an action of
this kind. (R. 133.)
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Plaintiffs contend that the lower court erred in entering the
above judgment of dismissal together with its eighth conclusion
of law on which such judgment of dismissal was based.

(R. 131.)

In rendering summary judgment for defendant State Road
Commission, the lower court adopted and incorporated the stipulaton of the parties concerning facts as its findings of fact and
made and entered its conclusions of law based thereon.

(R. 130.)

No additional evidence was presented by affidavit or otherwise,
and no other findings of fact whatsoever were made.

Since the

stipulation of facts submitted by the parties was limited solely
to those facts relevant to the contract issue before the court,
it included no facts directly bearing on the negligence issue
raised in the second count of plaintiffs1 complaint.

As a

result, the court did not make and enter a single conclusion of
law bearing on plaintiffs' second count except conclusion of law
number 8 which held that defendant was entitled to a judgment of
dismissal pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(R. 131.)
This court has held on numerous occasions that summary
judgment is properly granted only in cases in which there is no
dispute as to any issue which is material to the settlement of
the controversy.

Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah

1975); Burningham v. Ott, 525 P.2d 620 (Utah 1974).

If there

are controverted facts at issue, there is an issue that is genuine,
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and a motion for summary judgment should not be granted.
Pacific Wholesale Supply Co., 534 P.2d 895 (Utah 1975).

Trone v.
The

court may, however, render summary judgment on part of the case
where appropriate.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(d).

In the case at bar, the court was requested by all
parties to render summary judgment solely on the contract issue
raised in the first count of plaintiffs' complaint.

Neither side

submitted affidavits or any other evidence bearing on the
negligence count for the court's consideration.

Since plaintiffs'

allegations regarding defendant State Road Commission's negligence
in creating a defective and unsafe condition on the access road
were denied in defendant's answer (R. 12), controverted facts
remain at issue between the parties.

The lower court therefore

erred in rendering judgment on the whole case and should be
reversed.
CONCLUSION
According to Utah Code Ann. §27-12-9 (Repl. vol.
1969) , the State Road Commission may be sued on written contracts
made by it or under its authority.

Furthermore, the Utah

Governmental Immunity Act expressly waives immunity from suit
based on the alleged breach of a contractual obligation.
Code Ann. §63-30-5 (Repl. vol. 1968).

Utah

Plaintiffs contend that

the stipulation of facts, answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file herein make it clear that the State Road
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Commission incurred such a contractual obligation when it ratified the agreement of its attorney, and that no valid grounds
for disaffirming the contract exist.

Furthermore, even if such

grounds did exist, the lower court nevertheless erred in dismissing the whole case when controverted issues of material
fact still exist between the parties.

The judgment of the lower

court should therefore be reversed and the case remanded for
trial on its merits.
Respectfully submitted.

Robert F. Orton
G. Richard Hill
HANSEN & ORTON
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
2020 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
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